




Children love the thrill of roller-coaster rides. For
a national economy, however, the precipitous ups
and downs can wreak havoc. To a large extent,
economic growth in China during the 1980s was
like a roller-coaster ride. Bold economic reform
brought about impressive increases in economic
productivity and improvements in living stand-
ards; but, in the process, China also experienced
no fewer than three episodes of rising inflation
followed by sharp economic slowdowns and
business distress.
As the West watches Eastern Europe lurch toward
economic reform, it is well to keep in mind the
lessons of the Chinese experience. How a socialc
ist planned economy can move toward a more
market-oriented economy without unleashing
devastating inflation and economic instability is a
question of utmost importance not only to China,
but to other socialist planned economies as well.
China's experience indicates that in the short run
inflation can be avoided, or its severity lessened,
by judicious monetary policy. In the longer run,
however, effective monetary policy would neces-
sitate fundamental changes in the social and
economic structure.
The first cycle: 1979-83
In 1979 China began to implement its economic
reform, focusing on the rural sector. Almost im-
mediately, prices began to rise: 2 percent in
1979, then 6 percent in 1980.
The sources of the inflationary pressures during
that episode are not hard to find. In both 1979
and 1980 government budget deficits were large,
amounting respectively to 5.2 percent and 3.3
percent of the value ofthe national product,
compared to a small surplus in 1978. The deficit
arose because in 1979 the government raised its
procurement prices of farm products and ab-
sorbed the cost increase in its budget rather than
passing it to consumers. It financed the resultant
huge deficit by borrowing from the central bank,
which in turn printed money to finance the defi-
cit. As a result, money grew at an average rate of
28 percent a year in 1979 and 1980, compared
to 8.5 percent in 1978. The continuing rise in the
money supply increased the public's demand for
goods and services, and pushed up prices.
To shut off the source of inflation, in 1981 the
government stopped borrowing from the central
bank and, by drastically reducing its spending
on enterprise investments, reduced the budget
deficit by two-thirds. It financed the rest of the
deficit by forced purchase of government bonds,
and even used part ofthe proceeds to retire its
past borrowings from the central bank. As a re-
sult, the money growth rate was halved from 29
percent in 1980 to 14.5 percent in 1981. The mar-
ket response was equally quick: the inflation rate
dropped from 6.0 percent in 1980 to 2.4 percent
in 1981.
With the tightened fiscal and monetary policies,
signs of widespread business distress developed.
The total demand for goods declined, unsold
goods piled up, and enterprises were holding
mounting unpaid bills. Industrial production
increased only 1.7 percent in 1981, compared
to an 11 percent growth in 1980.
In the next three years, the government kept up
the conservative fiscal-monetary policy stance.
The budget deficit declined from 5.2 percent of
the value ofthe national output in 1979 to only
an average of 1.4 percent in 1981-83; the money
growth rate dropped from 29 percent in 1980 to
an annual average of 15 percent in the following
three years. As a result, inflation fell precipitously
from 6 percent in 1980 to an average of 1.9 per-
cent a year in 1981-83. Apparently, low inflation
was compatible with high economic growth, as
the output growth rate soon picked up from 4.9
percent in 1981 to 8.3 percent in 1982 and 9.8
percent in 1983.
The second cycle: 1984-1985
In 1984, encouraged by the success of rural
reform, the authorities turned to urban reform.
The scope of mandatory planning on productionFRBSF
and prices was substantially reduced. Enterprises
were given a wide berth in managing their own
affairs, and were told to look to banks, instead of
the government, for financing. Banks were sepa-
rated from the central bank and instructed to
operate as independent "profit-seeking" institu-
tions. In addition, decentralization transferred
much of the economic supervisory and regula-
tory power to the provincial and municipal
governments.
The 1984 reform unleashed a nationwide spend-
ing spree. Given autonomy, enterprises provided
generous wage increases, bonuses, and all sorts
of amenities to workers, and invested as much
funds as they could lay their hands on in plants
and equipment. The provincial officials were
equally eager to promote regional industrial de-
velopment, and ordered the provincial branches
ofthe banks, which the reform had placed under
their control, to extend Ciedit as requested by the
enterprises.
The result was an explosive increase in total
demand. In 1984, wages rose 20 percent, com-
pared with an average increase of 2.5 percent
during the preceding three years; bank credit
increased 31 percent, compared with an annual
average increase of 14 percent in 1981-83; the
money supply grew 49 percent, compared to an
average of 15 percent during the preceding three
years. As a result, the national output growth rate
leaped to 13.5 percent in 1984, greatly straining
the economy's productive capacities, compared
to an average annual rate of 8 percent in 1981-83.
The inflation rate lagged slightly behind, rising
from an annual average of 2.0 percent in 1981-83
to 2.8 percent in 1984, and accelerating to 8.8
percent in 1985.
The central authorities responded promptly in
1985 to the rising inflation by slashing govern-
ment expenditures, raising interest rates, enforc-
ing credit controls on provincial and municipal
branches of banks, and ordering reductions in
unbudgeted investments. To a large extent, the
belt-tightening policy was effective: as total bank
credit growth fell to 22 percent in 1985 from 31
percent in 1984, and money growth to 25 per-
cent from 49 percent, the inflation rate declined
from 8.8 percent in 1985 to 6.0 percent in 1986.
As in 1981, the measures exacted an economic
cost in terms of a sharp decline in industrial
output growth from 20 percent in the first half
of1985 to 5 percent a year later, rapidly rising
unsold goods, and a steep increase in enterprise
losses. As in 1981, the pressures on the central
government to ease the austerity measures
mounted.
The third cycle: 1986-1990
Unlike the years that followed the 1981
slowdown, the central government this time
relented. In 1986, the restrictive policy was
reversed. Credit was eased. Monetary growth
accelerated from an average annual rate of 14
percent during the year that ended in the first
quarter of 1986 to 28 percent during the six
quarters from 1986Q2 to 1987Q3. Then, after a
brief respite in 1987Q4, monetary growth leaped
to an annual average rate of 49 percent a year
during the first three quarters of 1988. Under this
strong and steady stimulation, national output
grew at an unsustainable rate of 11 percent a year
in both 1987 and 1988, while inflation acceler-
ated to 9 percent in 1987 and 27 percent in
1988. In the midst of this rising inflation, the au-
thorities announced in mid-1988 a decision to lift
all price controls in 1989. The public reacted by
rushing to the banks to withdraw their savings
and on to the stores to strip their shelves bare.
The pro-inflation policy crashed.
Again, the authorities responded in September
1988 by tightening credit control, raising interest
rates, ordering drastic cutbacks in investment
expenditures, and also re-imposing price con-
trols. In line with the severity of the inflation
that preceded them, these measures were much
stronger this time than previously and were car-
ried out with greater tenacity. Again, the same
plot unfolded, but with stronger intensity: infla-
tion dropped from 27 percent in 1988 to 0.6
percent in 1990Q3, and industrial growth from
18 percent in 1988Q4 to zero percent a year
later. Unemployment was widespread. Hundreds
of thousands of urban workers returned to the
countryside, where they could find little work
to do. Those who stayed on their jobs turned
out goods that could not be sold. In 1990, China
suffered the severest economic recession in
recent decades.
Assessment
From this quick preliminary survey of China's
inflation and economic instability in the 1980s,
obviously it would be premature to draw firm
conclusions. Nevertheless, some tentative im-
pressions might be useful for further studies.
First, China's experience in the 1980s does not
warrant the pessimistic view that inflation and
economic instability are endemic of socialist
economic reform. Misguided policy was the
primary, if not the only, cause of China's roller-coaster economic growth during the decade.
The inflation in 1980 can be attributed to mone-
tizing the fiscal deficit, and the inflation during
1985 and 1987-89 to unrestrained enterprise
spending on capital investment and wage
increases, financed by unrestrained extension
of bank credit
The experiences in all three episodes demon-
strate the familiar proposition that inflation is
basically a monetary phenomenon, which means
that it could be avoided, or at least its severity
reduced, by appropriate monetary policy. In-
deed, the corrective measures adopted in 1981
provide convincing evidence that inflation could
be quickly brought under control without pro-
longed economic dislocations, once monetizing
the fiscal deficit ceased.
Second, China's experience also shows that
monetary policy alone cannot prevent or fight
inflation, because it is by necessity conducted
in a politically charged environment. Inflation
resurged in 1987 because during the preceding
year the authorities were unwilling or unable
to bear the cost of temporary dislocations and
prematurely resumed monetary stimulation. To
bear with the pains of temporarv dislocations is
basically a poiitical decisi~n which no monetary
authorities in the world can make without
staunch political support.
In China, and perhaps also in other socialist
economies, political support for a strong and
unwavering anti-inflationary monetary policy is
hindered by the nation's social and economic
structure. Because each enterprise is responsible
for the welfare-including housing, health, chil-
dren's education, recreation, retirement pension;
in short, almost all aspects of life-of its workers
and their families, allowing enterprises, espe-
cially large enterprises, to fail would cause
serious social dislocations. Moreover, the same
paternalism permeates the political structure:
provincial and municipal authorities are held re-
sponsible for the welfare of all the people within
their jurisdictions to an extent unimaginable in
market economies. Since the people's livelihoods
depend on the enterprises, the local authorities
often are inclined to place the interests of the en-
terprises in their territories ahead ofthe national
interest.
Economic reform conferred autonomy to enter-
prises and elevated the role of the banks, without
making basic changes to this social and eco-
nomic structure. Prior to reform, the government
budget subsidized the unprofitable enterprises;
reform merely shifted the burden to the banks.
Indirect financing of enterprises gave the false
impression of the market mechanism at work,
when in fact there was none. Concealed deficit
financing has substituted open deficit financing.
The lack oftransparency has clouded discussions
on inflation and hindered inflation contro!.
Remedies
In the short run, given the unchanged economic
and social structure, monetary policy can be
made more effective by gearing it primarily to-
wards achieving and maintaining price stability,
and by assuring it a high degree of political sup-
port from both the central and the provincial
authorities. Decentralization of power since 1984
has weakened the political basis for monetary
policy, but not inflicted irreparable damage
to it. The vigor and rigor with which monetary
policy was tightened, and inflation stamped out,
in 1989-90 provides strong evidence that where
there is a will, there can still be an effective
anti-inflationary monetary policy.
In the longer run, however, a change in the
nation's economic and social structure may be
needed. So long as the structure is unchanged,
enterprises may continue to rely on either the
government or the banks to bail them out ofthe
results of their overspending; and, given auton-
omy, it is likely that they will always overspend.
Since government budgets are nearly always
hard-pressed, the temptation to pass the buck
to the banks may be irresistible.
To change the present economic and social
structure does not mean to abandon people's
welfare to the vagaries of the marketplace. The
government can be as paternalistic towards so-
cial welfare as it wants to, without being tied
down to the existing economic and social struc-
ture, which is probably the least efficient way
of delivering social welfare services. To search
for an alternative system that will best fit the
Chinese conditions requires careful study.
But, that is another story.
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